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Statement of Facts:

Appellant Long was charged with "Recreational Trespass," a misdemeanor, under
LC. § 36-1603 (a). He harvested a deer on land adjacent to a dirt road in Kootenai
County. While coming back to the road after he was met by Fish & Game conservation
officers who advised him that located near where he had gone up the hill, there was a "No
Hunting" sign. One of the conservation officers later located the owner, Mr. Froelich,
and he agreed sign a complaint for Recreational Trespass. Long was not cited for illegally
hunting or illegally harvesting a deer.
The Froelich property consists of approximately 93 to 95 acres. 1 It borders the dirt
road for a long distance. It was later determined that Mr. Froelich had placed a sign at
the driveway to his house. This sign stated "Posted, Private Property, Hunting, Fishing,
Trapping or Trespassing for any Purpose is strictly prohibited." Mr. Froelich placed the
sign next to his driveway because he didn't want people shooting towards his house.2 The
next sign on his property bordering the road was located approximately 2,000 3 feet
further on down the road. This sign stated "No Hunting." There was another sign at the
base of a large tree, attached to a root, further on down the road. This sign stated "No
Hunting without Written Permission." Long testified that he did not see the signs and
there was corroborating testimony that the signs were not placed in locations that would
have been visible to Long.

1

Tr. p. 137, 1. 23.
Tr. p. 139, 1. 2-5.
3 Tr. p. 169, 1. 16-19.

2
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ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether it was error to affirm the dismissal of the misdemeanor
charge from the bench in the presence of the defendant and
subsequently, two days later, file a written decision reversing the
magistrate's dismissal of the charge.

2.

Whether it was error to hold that a "No Hunting" sign is of like
meaning to a "No Trespassing" sign under LC. Section 36-1603 (a)
Recreational Trespass when it is not a sign of like meaning under LC.
Section 18-7008 Trespass.

3.

Whether it was error to hold that failure to depart from property
upon being notified is not an essential element of a violation of LC.
Section 36-1603 Recreational Trespass.

ARGUMENT
1.

It was error for the district court after affirming the dismissal and entering
defendant, to file a
its reasoning in the record in the presence of
memorandum decision, two days later, reversing the dismissal.
At the completion of the misdemeanor jury trial, while jury instructions were

being discuss prior to closing arguments, the magistrate granted Long's I.C.R. Rule 29
Motion to Dismiss. 4 The State appealed. At the commencement of the appeal hearing the
district court, prior to proceeding, confirmed that Long was present. 5 Immediately
following argument, with all counsel and Long present, the district court addressed the
arguments and affirmed the magistrate's dismissal on other grounds. The district court

4

5

R. p .. 99
Hearing Tr. p. 3, I. 1-4.
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stated "this would always be my ruling" 6 and directed Long's counsel to prepare a written
order. 7 At the conclusion of the hearing and after hearing for a second time that the
misdemeanor charge was dismissed, Long left the courthouse exonerated.
Two days after its order, and grounds therefor, were entered from the bench and
before the order had been submitted to it as directed, the district court filed a
memorandum decision stating that while it was preparing the memorandum decision it
came across a different statute 8 and reversed the magistrate's dismissal.

Given its

directive that Long's counsel prepare the order affirming the dismissal, this change
came as a complete surprise to Long who was present at the hearing, heard the court's
statements, and heard the magistrate's dismissal affirmed.
The memorandum confirmed what had been clearly stated from the bench.
"Court was convinced no crime had occurred. 9 However the decision states that while
"preparing this Memorandum Decision, this Court came across" another statute and,
despite being "aware this is a different conclusion than that which was reached in open
court at the conclusion or oral argument" 10 reversed the magistrate's dismissal. 11
The memorandum cited the Idaho case, State v. Phillips1 2 in which a district
court's sentence, rendered orally, was different than the written order of commitment, the
Court held that the sentence rendered from the bench was ambiguous and remanded the
matter for re-sentencing. The district court's written decision also cited an Idaho civil
6

Hearing Tr. p. 20, I. I l-12.
Hearing Tr. p. 20, 1. 24-25.
8
R.p.155.
9
R. p. 155.
10
R. p. 160-161.
II R. p. 161.
12
Statev. Phillips, 99 Idaho 354,581 P. 2d 1173 (1978), R. p. 160-161.
7
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case, two criminal decisions from Oregon, and one from West Virginia, but failed to
discuss their applicability to its changed decision. 13 Counsel has been unable to locate the
cited West Virginia case. State v. Phillips cited State v. Kerrigan 14 which involved an oral
sentencing that was followed by a subsequent written order that revoked the defendant's
"probation-like status." The Court held that the defendant had been placed in a
"probation-like status" and that the subsequent written order revoking it "cannot measure
up to the 'consideration of fairness and sound judicial administration' which this Court
has held are mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and art. I § 13 of the Idaho Constitution." 15 In State v. Swain/State v. Goldsmith, 16 the
Oregon trial court suppressed evidence and dismissed criminal proceedings at a
preliminary hearing. In a subsequent written order the court gave the state the option of
electing to continue with the hearing without the evidence. The state did not elect to
proceed with the hearing nor did it appeal the suppression order. Instead it indicted the
defendants and with the use of the suppressed evidence, obtained guilty verdicts. The
appeals court held the suppression of evidence was res judicata and reversed the
convictions. In State v. Jacobs, 17 the Oregon trial court,

at the sentencing hearing,

announced its intended sentence of a defendant found guilty after a jury trial of two
felony and two misdemeanor crimes. The defendant's counsel requested a continuance to
submit briefing on the intended sentence. After two continuances a hearing was held on
the sentencing arguments and the court continued the matter for another week for entry of
13

R.p.161.
State v. Kerrigan, 98 Idaho 701 (1977).
15
State v. Kerrigan, 98 Idaho 701, 705 (1977)
16
State v. Swain/State v. Goldsmith, 267 Or. 527, 517 P 2d 684 (1974).
17
State v. Jacobs, 200 Or. App. 665, 117 P 3d 290 (Or. App)

14
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its decision. The appellate court held that from the discussion regarding the third
continuance it was unclear whether the court was scheduling another hearing at which the
defendant would appear. A written opinion, imposing a more severe sentence that the
court stated was intended, was entered without the appearance of the defendant. The
Oregon appellate court held that the court's action violated the defendants statutory and
constitutional rights to be personally present at sentencing stating that the court could
change its mind on the sentence but that a sentence needed to be pronounced in open
court in the defendant' presence.
LC. § 19-3504 provides that the court may order an action to be dismissed and
that "the reasons of the dismissal must be set forth in an order entered upon the minutes."

r.c. § 19-3506 provides that:
"An order for the dismissal of the action as provided in this chapter,
is a bar to any other prosecution for the same offense, if it is misdemeanor"
In this matter the order of the district court affirmed the magistrate's dismissal of the
misdemeanor charge against Long. The minutes of the hearing, at pages 151-152 of the
record on appeal, set forth the reasons for the dismissal. The transcript of the hearing sets
for the reasons for the dismissal verbatim. 18
The memorandum decision filed by the district court appears to be in the manner
of an order nunc pro tune, which literally means "now for then." 19 In Ward v. Lupinacci, 20
the Court discussed a court's action by quoting the trial court's acknowledgment that "It

18

19
20

Tr. p. 18, I. 11-p. 21.
see Westmont Tractor Co. v. Estate of Westfall, lJ 2 Idaho 712, 735 P 2d 1023 (1987) citing Black's Law
Dictionary (5 th Edition l 981)
Ward v. Lupinacci, Jl 1 Idaho 40, 720 P 2d 223 (Idaho App 1986).
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was my intent that at a later time a judgment would be presented to me in compliance
with the jury verdict and at that time I would sign it." The Court held that "a judgment
may not be given nunc pro tune effect to correct a judicial error, but only to correct a
clerical error."21
In the present case the district court's bench order, affirming the magistrate's
dismissal, is not ambiguous. Any ambiguity is dispelled by its comments in the
memorandum:
"this Court was convinced no crime had occurred, and Judge Marano's granting
22
of Long's I.C.R. 29 motion must be upheld, although for different reasons."
"Because counsel for State could not point to any other statute other
than LC. § 36-1402 (b) ( 5), this Court was convinced at the end of
oral argument that a violation of LC.§ 36-1603 (a), which is what
the State charged, was not a crime. " 23

Assuming, without conceding that the district court's post dismissal order
changing is interpretation of the law is correct and that the magistrate's determination
was erroneous, the district court's memorandum decision improperly attempted to change
its order dismissing the charge from the bench, in the presence of Lang. It was not
attempting, nor did it claim to be, attempting to correct a clerical error.
It is submitted that the dismissal of Long's misdemeanor charge after a full trial,

the district court's entering its order from the bench in the presence of Long affirming the
dismissal, and then its written decision purporting to reverse its own order cannot be
considered to measure up to the consideration of fairness and sound judicial
21

Ward v. Lupinacci, at p. 42.
R. p. 155.
23
R. p. 160.
22
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administration' which this Court has held is mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article I § 13 of the Idaho Constitution."

24

ARGUMENT
2. The District Court erred in holding that a "No Hunting" sign is a sign, or notice,
of like meaning to a "No Trespassing" sign under LC. Section 36-1603(a)
Recreational Trespass but not under LC. § 18-7008 Trespass.
Long was charged with "Recreational Trespass", a misdemeanor, under LC. § 361603 (a). He harvested a deer near a dirt road in Kootenai County. After he harvested the
deer as he was coming back to the road he was contacted by Fish & Game conservation
officers who advised him that near where he had gone up the hill there was a "No
Hunting" sign. One of the conservation officer drove up the road and located the owner,
Mr. Froelich, and he agreed to sign a complaint for Recreational Trespass.
The Froelich property consists of approximately 93 to 95 acre. 25 It's border
follows the dirt road for a long distance. It was later determined that Mr. Froelich had a
sign at the driveway to his house. It stated "Posted, Private Property, Hunting, Fishing,
Trapping or Trespassing for any Purpose is strictly prohibited." This sign was put up by
Mr. Froelich because he didn't want people shooting towards his house. 26 The next sign
on his property was located approximately 2,000 27 feet down the road, and up the side of
a draw in a location that it would have been difficult to be seen by someone driving down
the road away from the driveway. It stated "No Hunting." There was another sign at the
base of a large tree, attached to a root, further down the road that stated "No Hunting
24

State v. Kerrigan, 98 Jdaho 701, 705 (1977)
Tr. p. 137, 23.
26
Tr. p. 137, 23.
27
Tr. p. 169, I. 16-19.
25
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without Written Permission." Long testified that he did not see the signs near where he
went up the hill, and that could have been an issue for the jury to resolve if the trial had
proceeded that far. I.C. § 36-1603 (a), in part, provides:
No person shall enter the real property of another for the purposes of
hunting without the permission of the owner, which property is either cultivated or
posted with legible "No Trespassing" signs or other signs of like meaning placed
in a conspicuous manner on or near all boundaries at intervals of not less than one
( 1) sign per 660 feet.
When the State's proposed jury instructions were being considered by the magistrate he
addressed its proposed instruction on I.C. § 36-1603 (a). 28 Long's counsel was not asked
to make any argument for the magistrate to consider.
The magistrate, after reading the portion of proposed instruction requiring that the
property to be posted with legible "no trespassing signs" sua sponte stated that "the no
hunting signs don't apply." 29 The prosecutor directed the magistrate's attention to the
language in the statute referencing "or other like notices," and the court responded:
"Well, there's a difference between no trespassing and no hunting.
Trespassing is not the same as hunting .. .It's got to say no trespassing," 30 "the sign
says no hunting without written permission. It doesn't say no trespassing without
written permission." 31
The prosecutor argued that language on one sign "without written permission" should
"imply" a person would trespassing. 32 The court replied reasoning that the language
means a person "can't hunt without written permission" and it doesn't say "no trespassing

28

Tr. p. 213.
Tr. p. 213, 1. 12.
30
Tr. p. 213, 1. 15-25, p. 214, 1. 1-3.
31
Tr. p. 214, 1. 10-12.
32
Tr. p. 214, l. 6.
29
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without permission. " 33 The court further reasoned that to be "of like meaning" a sign
language must "mean the same as no trespassing. " 34 The magistrate, at that time the
longest sitting judge in the First Judicial District, with years of experience in addressing
fish and game issues, stated:
"There's a huge difference between hunting and trespassing. I mean
that's common English usage."
"Trespassing means you can't go on the property, period, for any

reason." 35

The court elaborated:
"The purpose of the sign, you can go onto somebody's property that has a no
hunting sign as long as you're not hunting. Okay? But that isn't the same as
trespassing. Trespassing means you can't go on the property, period, for any
reason." 36
The prosecutor asked the court what would a sign of like meaning to "no trespassing"
trespassing state? The court responded that he supposed it would state something like,
"Don't come on this property" or "Come on this property and you'll get shot," I've seen
· 37
t h at sign.
In summary the magistrate held:
"hunting and trespassing are not the same. Trespass means you can't
come on the property. The one says that you can't hunt on this property. There's a
difference between that, and it's recognized by the legislature because they have a
different statute that also deals with trespassing. 38
Following this colloquy, between the court and the prosecutor, the court asked Long's
counsel, "Do you have a motion?" Long's counsel responded, "A motion to dismiss." The
magistrate held that pursuant to Rule 29 there was insufficient evidence for the jury to
33

Tr. p. 214, I. 7-8, p. 10-12.
Tr. p. 215, I. 3-5.
35
Tr. p. 215, I. 6-7, I. 19-20.
36
Tr. p. 215, I. 16-20.
37
Tr.p.218,1. 13-17.
38
Tr. p. 219, I. 1-9.
34
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come to come to the conclusion that the defendant violated the statute and dismissed the
charge. 39
At the conclusion of the appeal hearing the district court stated:
"no hunting is different than no trespassing."
At the hearing on the State's appeal the district court held that the meaning of the
words "no trespassing" in a hunting and fishing statute is different than the same words,
"no trespassing," in a trespass statute. 40 The district court however affirmed the dismissal
because LC. § 36-1603 doesn't define it as a crime. 41
The Court, in State v. Kell/2 , addressing an attempt to suppress contraband seized
pursuant to a search warrant obtained after police officers entered upon land with a
barbed wire fence, had occasion to discuss the requirement of "no trespassing" signs in
relation to a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court held that before an intrusion
onto private land in a rural area can be considered unlawful, the property owner must take
the extra step of posting his property in the prescribed manner with "no trespassing"
signs. LC.§§ 6-202, 18-7008 and 36-1603 43 were cited as authority.
The district court erred by holding that the requirement of a "no trespassing" sign
under the Title 18 crime statutes is different than "no trespassing" under the Title 36
Recreational Trespass statutes. Rather than treating the exact same words appearing in
two statutes addressing "no trespass, similarly, under the rule of lenity in criminal cases,

39

Tr. p. 10-19.
Hearing Tr. p. 18, l. 19-20, p. 20, 1. 15-19.
41
Hearing Tr. p. 19, l. 21-24.
42
State v. Kelly, 106 Idaho 268, 678, P 2d 60 (Idaho App. 1984)
43
State v. Kelly, 106 Idaho 268,275, 678, P 2d 60 (Idaho App. 1984)
40
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the district court should have construed "no trespassing" in Title 36 to mean the same as
it does in Title 18. 44
The property owner testified that his "no hunting" sign didn't mean "no hunting" at
all. It didn't apply to "his family" and it didn't apply to persons whom he gave
permission too. 45 One of the conservation officers involved told persons that the property
might not have been properly posted. 46 In addition to the phrases that the magistrate
suggested were "notices of like meaning" additional admonitions meaning "no
trespassing" would be signs stating "Keep Out," "Do not enter," "No access," or "No
admittance."
Taking the district court's expansive interpretation that "No Hunting" signs mean
"No Trespassing" despite it could be argued by an aggressive prosecutor that the
landowner's posting of two "No Hunting" signs approximately 2,000 feet from the one
"No Trespassing" sign, in a rural area and on a dirt road, was in and of its self the
commission of a crime under Title 36. LC. § 36-1510 makes it a crime to harass,
intimidate, or threaten by any means any person who is or was engaged in the lawful
taking of wildlife. Long possessed the necessary hunting license and tag to harvest a deer.
The posting of "No Hunting" signs that failed to give the required "No Trespass" wording
in a situation such occurred here where the signs were also not placed every 660 feet as
required by statute could be argued to be harassment of a person engaged in the lawful

44

see State v. Barnes, 124 Idaho 379, 380, 859 P. 2d 1387, 1388 (1993).
Tr. p. 140, 1. 22-23.
46
Tr. p. 176, I. 12-18,
45
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taking of wildlife. As the Court in State

v.

Kell/ 7 discussed, Idaho's historical tradition

regarding open land requires landowners to take additional effort to keep persons off their
land. This combined with Idaho's equally as long and historic encouragement of hunting,
that requires strict compliance with prescribed means in order to keep one's lands closed
to the public could be construed to constitute harassment.
In this case the landowner did not take the required steps, or any reasonable effort,
to close off his lands to hunting or even access persons doing other activities. He testified
he didn't even know if the signs he did put up were still up. Despite the fact that
landowner was used to having "quite a few hunters" in the area of his property48 he chose
to not post the required signage. He didn't even know if both the "no hunting" signs
were still where he put them. 49 The signs didn't state "No Trespass" and they did not
meet the signage spacing requirements of the statute. Even if the Court agrees with the
district court determination of signage of like meaning, the evidence is undisputed that
property owner took no reasonable steps to attempt to prevent hunting, and the placement
of any signs did not comply with the statutorily required signage every 660 feet. The
holding of the district court should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
3.

The district court erred in holding that failure to depart upon being notified
in writing or orally from the property is not an essential element of a
violation of J.C.§ 36-1603.

47

State v. Kelly, 106 Idaho 268, 274, 678 P. 2d 60 (1984)
Tr. p. 141, I. 3-4.
49
Tr. p. 144, 1. 8-13.
48

15 APPELLANT LONG'S OPENING BRIEF

The district court held that failure to depart from property immediately upon
receiving notice to depart from the owner or agent is not an element of a violation of
I.C.§ 36-1603 (a). It provides, in part:
(a) No person shall fail to depart immediately from the real property of another
after being notified in writing or orally by the owner of the real property or the
owner's authorized agent.
The most fundamental premise underlying judicial review of the legislature's enactments
is that, unless the result is palpably absurd, the courts must assume the legislature meant
what it said." 50 The Court will not interpret a statute in such a way as to make mere
surplusage of provisions included therein. 51 The Idaho legislature's expressed intent, in
the very next section I.C. § 36-1604, is to encourage owners of land to make land
available to the public for recreational purposes. It is makes absolute sense that the
legislature would also require that a person first refuse to leave the property after being
told to do so, by the owner or owner's agent, as an element of the Recreational Trespass
statute. After all the act complained of was Long's presence on the property. The
complaint was not that he shot a rifle from the property or that he harvested a deer on the
property. Contrary to the district court's assertion, that requiring such notice to leave as
an element of a violation of the recreational statute would be an "impossible absurd
construction," the legislature's requiring this as an element is entirely consistent with the
express wording of the statute and the legislature's support of public access. Idaho's
historic approach to access to land is that if land, especially rural open land, is not
properly fenced or posted with specific signage it is open for recreation. Consistent with

50

51

State, Dept ofLaw Enforcement v. One 1955 Willy's Jeep, 100 Idaho 150, 153, 595 P2d 1206, 1219
(1991)
Harleyv. Miller-Stephan, 107 Idaho 688, 692 P 2d 332 (1984).
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the recreational aspect of the "Recreational Trespass" statute it makes eminent sense for
the legislature to require that a simple request to leave the property be extended, before a
criminal charge is filed.
In this case the evidence is not disputed that neither the owner

52

nor an agent of the

owner requested Long to leave the premises. They were not even aware that he had been
present on the property until after the conservation officers contacted him.

53

The

conservation officers didn't ask him to leave the property. 54 It was the conservation
officers attempting to punish Long by having a Recreational Trespass charge brought
against Long, who possessed a valid hunting license and deer tag, for harvesting a deer.
That strikes the undersigned hunter and fisherman as inappropriate conduct by the
conservation officers in Idaho where access to public land for hunting and fishing is
consistent with public policy.

CONCLUSION
The district court's attempt to resurrect the misdemeanor charge of Recreational
Trespass after dismissing the charge from the bench and entering it reasoning into the
record should be reversed. The district court's action, taken in the absence of the
defendant, does not measure up to the consideration of fairness and sound judicial
administration, mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article I,§ 13 of the Idaho Constitution. The Court should also confirm that "no
trespass" means "no trespass" in both the crime statutes as well as the Recreational

52

Tr. p. 146, I. 21-25.
Tr. p. 98, 1. 20-25.
54
Tr. p. 112, I. 2-4.

53
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statutes. The Court should also clarify that a charge of Recreational Trespass requires,
before a person is chargeable with trespassing, that a person must fail to depart after
being asked to leave the property. The decision of the district court should be reversed
and this matter remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint.
/

DATED this / S day of September, 2011.

Starr Kel o, Attorney for Appellant Long

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I certify that I served two copies of Appellant's Opening
Brief on Respondents on the ;:- day of September, 2011, by sending the same by
United States Mail, postage prepaid thereon, in an envelope addressed to:
Lawrence G. Wasden
Attorney General
Lori Fleming
Deputy Attorney General
700 W. Jefferson, Suite 310
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

~(ff~
Starr Kelso
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